Fighting the Terrorists in Afghanistan | Concluding Operations in Iraq | New START Treaty | Modernizing Our Nuclear Deterrent | Defending Against Ballistic Missile Threats
The first and foremost responsibility of our federal government is to defend the security of our nation. Fulfilling that responsibility is particularly important in light of the 21st century threats of international terrorism and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. It requires a strong military – second to none – robust intelligence networks capable of identifying and neutralizing threats before they arise, and superior homeland security.
In 2009, President Obama ordered the start of a surge of 30,000 troops into Afghanistan, saying:
“Our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of the violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda. It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted as I speak. This is no idle danger; no hypothetical threat. In the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. This danger will only grow if the region slides backwards, and al Qaeda can operate with impunity. We must keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and to do that, we must increase the stability and capacity of our partners in the region.”
I supported the President’s commitment of additional troops to Afghanistan but was troubled by the July 2011 withdrawal date he also proposed. Our national security is indeed at stake in Afghanistan, as he says, so our commitment to the safety of our nation and the people of Afghanistan should not expire on an arbitrary date.
For the last year, the military has implemented the President’s orders and the additional troops have enabled U.S. and allied forces to push into regions, such as Helmand and Kandahar, that were previously dominated by the Taliban. General Petraeus, now commander of all U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, has also prosecuted a new counterinsurgency strategy including expanded special operations strikes against the leadership of the Taliban and other insurgent groups, added additional civilian and reconstruction assistance, and enhanced security measures designed to protect the Afghan people. This strategy and the sacrifice of our soldiers have yielded substantial gains in the last year. But, as the President’s December 2010 review of the situation in Afghanistan made clear, “these gains remain fragile and reversible.”
General Petraeus has also been clear that much remains to be accomplished in Afghanistan. While the defeat of al Qaeda and the Taliban remains our primary objective, we must continue to work with our allies and the Afghan government to address a number of other issues, such as improving governance, building a capable Afghan army, combating the narcotics trade, and reducing corruption. Despite the progress made in Afghanistan, I believe a substantial withdrawal from that country this year would be premature.
General Petraeus has provided some reassurance that the President’s July 2011 deadline will not be the end of the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he said, “July 2011 will mark the beginning of a process, not the date when the U.S. heads for the exits and turns out the lights.” I hope the General is right and that any withdrawal or redeployment of soldiers is based on conditions on the ground.
I have visited Afghanistan several times and have met with that country’s leaders, as well as tribal elders in the provinces. I came away convinced of the need to finish our mission there and prevail against the Taliban and al Qaeda. To do otherwise would facilitate a return to Taliban control of areas that could then be used by al Qaeda to recruit and train terrorists, generate revenue and plan terrorist operations. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton observed, “If Afghanistan were taken over by the Taliban, I can't tell you how fast al Qaeda would be back in Afghanistan.”
Success in Iraq is largely attributable to decisions made in 2007, when, despite overwhelming opposition at the time, then-President Bush ordered a surge of troops into that country to carry out the counterinsurgency strategy devised by General Petraeus. The surge led to undeniable security and political gains in Iraq – gains that paved the way for a drawdown of U.S. troops.
The drawdown was negotiated by the Bush administration in the Status of Forces Agreement at the end of 2008. It called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009, and all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011.
While the last major combat unit left Iraq in August 2010 and Iraqis have taken the lead in security operations since then, almost 50,000 U.S. soldiers remain in Iraq to train, advise, and, when necessary, assist the Iraqi security forces.
As the remaining forces withdraw, we must carefully monitor conditions on the ground in Iraq. If the security situation begins to deteriorate beyond the control of the Iraqi forces, we must be ready to assist the Iraqi government and modify our plans to prevent Iraq from falling back into sectarian violence. The gains made in Iraq have come at too great an expense – in terms of the lives of American servicemen and women, and American resources – to do otherwise.
In April 2010, President Obama and Russian President Medvedev signed the New START Treaty. I opposed its ratification because I do not believe it adequately protects U.S. interests. In fact, the Administration acceded to a number of Russian demands without winning corresponding concessions from the Russian side, and agreed to a treaty that could undermine U.S. national security and weaken the position of future U.S. negotiators.
The treaty has a weaker verification regime than previous nuclear agreements with Russia. In particular, the agreement reduces the amount of data exchanged between the U.S. and Russia, as well as the number of inspections performed at Russian nuclear facilities. What’s more, it does not include a provision to keep U.S. inspectors on the ground in Russia at its primary missile production facility in Votkinsk. Without inspectors at this facility, the United States will lose key information about Russian activity to modernize its nuclear weapons.
The treaty does nothing to address the large disparity in non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, of which Russia has thousands. The U.S. and Russian governments also maintain substantially different interpretations of the treaty’s references to advanced U.S. conventional weapons, such as non-nuclear long range missile systems, and, significantly, U.S. missile defenses. The Russian government claims that nonbinding language in the treaty’s preamble referring to missile defense in fact limits missile defense development and it continually refers to understandings reached between the two countries during the negotiations on the treaty. The U.S. State Department disagrees, yet it refuses to make the treaty’s negotiating record available to Senators. The different interpretations of the treaty will likely cause future disagreements between the U.S. and Russia, and should have been resolved during the negotiating phase.
These flaws in the treaty could simply have been solved through diligent and firm negotiations. However, it appears the Obama administration was more concerned about having a nuclear treaty with Russia than getting the agreement right. The Senate nevertheless approved the treaty on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71 to 26 – the narrowest margin of approval ever for a nuclear treaty.
For some time, the United States has been the only major nuclear power without a nuclear weapons modernization program, yet our national security and the security of our allies continue to depend on the strength of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates explained the need for modernization this way: “Sensitive parts [of our nuclear arsenal] do not last . . . To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.” The United States is the only nuclear weapons state that has attempted to maintain a nuclear weapons program in these circumstances.
In fact, we have not conducted a nuclear-weapons test since 1992, have not designed a new warhead since the 1980s, and have not built one since the 1990s. Moreover, funding for the national laboratories that maintain our nuclear weapons has been inconsistent and inadequate for many years. I believe the United States must invest heavily in a program to restore confidence in our nuclear deterrent by modernizing our aging nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, by rebuilding our nuclear facilities, some of which were constructed during the Manhattan Project era, and by ensuring we have the highly-skilled scientists and technicians needed to drive this program forward.
With the reduction of deployed warheads in the U.S. arsenal required by New START, it becomes much more important to ensure the effectiveness and reliability of the weapons that remain with a robust modernization plan. During the debate on New START, I urged the Administration to increase its commitment to modernize our nuclear complex. As a result of a lengthy process of review of the administration’s proposals, the President ultimately announced his plan to commit an additional $15 billion over the next 10 years to renovate and restore our nuclear capabilities (above the $70 billion originally planned by the Obama Administration in 2010). Prior to the ratification of the treaty, and, in fact, as a part of the ratification document itself, the Senate affirmed its support for the modernization program. This investment is critical to the national security of the United States, and the Administration and Congress must now follow through with the necessary resources to revitalize our nuclear deterrent.
The proliferation of ballistic missiles, which can carry nuclear, chemical, or biological payloads, is a serious concern. Roughly two dozen countries, including North Korea and Iran, now have or are developing such weapons.
Iran and North Korea have successfully tested medium-range ballistic missiles, which can reach many of our allies and U.S. soldiers deployed overseas, and are working on longer-range systems that could strike the United States. According to the Secretary of Defense, North Korea could possess a missile capable of striking the United States within five years. Likewise, U.S. intelligence agencies believe Iran is pursuing long-range missile capabilities through its existing space program. China has also developed advanced ballistic missiles that are specifically designed to destroy U.S. aircraft carriers – the primary instrument of U.S. military power in Asia and the Pacific regions. The United States must be prepared for these threats, including with a robust missile defense system that can protect American forces, our citizens, and our allies from attack.
I support the development of missile defenses, and great strides in that direction have been made in recent years. The Missile Defense Agency, for example, developed, deployed, and integrated ground- and sea-based interceptors, Patriot units, and sensors based on land, at sea and in space.
Regrettably, these gains are now at risk under the budgets that President Obama has proposed. President Obama has reduced funding for missile defense by about $4 billion compared to the previous Administration’s plans; eliminated advanced projects like the Kinetic Energy Interceptor and Air-Borne Laser; and drastically altered U.S. agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic, which would have deployed missile defenses for the protection of the United States. Moreover, he has completely overlooked space-based missile defense, which could substantially reduce the threat posed by ballistic missiles. It is imperative that we provide sufficient funding to ensure a robust and effective missile defense.
